科学研究
报告题目：Do Borrowers and Banks Increase the Relative Timeliness of Disclosing Bad versus Good News under CECL?
报告人：Xinrong Qiang强欣荣
报告时间：2024年6月27日（周四）10:00-11:30
报告地点：劝学楼245
主办单位：东北财经大学会计学院 辽宁省资本市场财务与会计研究生创新与学术交流中心
【报告摘要】
Under the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) model, banks should fully recognize expected credit losses upon loan origination. To estimate and reduce the losses, banks may demand timelier bad-news disclosure by borrowers. We find that borrowers of banks adopting CECL increase the relative timeliness of disclosing bad versus good news under CECL. This effect of CECL is more pronounced for borrowers facing a greater bank demand for timelier bad-news disclosure and a larger cost of switching from adopting banks. Conversely, although adopting banks increase the timeliness of bad-news disclosure under CECL, they increase the timeliness of good-news disclosure to a greater extent, making their relative timeliness of disclosing bad versus good news decrease. This decrease is more pronounced for banks facing a larger increase in credit losses and severer market reaction to bad-news disclosure. Collectively, CECL improves borrowers’ relative timeliness of disclosing bad versus good news but not that of banks.
【报告人简介】
Xinrong Qiang（强欣荣）本科和硕士均毕业于清华大学，硕士毕业后曾留校任教，期间曾两次荣获清华大学经济管理学院优秀教师奖。后去美国纽约州立大学布法罗分校管理学院攻读会计学博士并在美国怀俄明大学任教三年，期间博士论文以独立作者身份发表于The Accounting Review并获学校杰出青年研究奖。之后从美国回到厦门，在厦门大学财务管理与会计研究院担任副教授和博士生导师，期间曾担任副院长。
【特别提醒】
未经论文作者和主办方允许，严禁将讲座内容录制并公开传播，违者将有可能被追究法律责任。
