科学研究
报告题目：Implicit government guarantees and shareholder-creditor conflicts: Evidence from corporate dividend policy
报告人：何杨
报告时间：2026年5月7日（周四）13:30-15:00
报告地点：劝学楼245
主办单位：东北财经大学会计学院 辽宁省资本市场财务与会计研究生创新与学术交流中心
【报告摘要】
Implicit government guarantees (IGGs) undermine market-based discipline and reshape shareholder-creditor relationships. Exploiting China's first bond default in 2014, namely the Chaori bond default, as a no-bailout shock that diminishes IGGs, we investigate the impact of IGGs on shareholder-creditor conflicts. Using corporate dividend payments to depict the conflicts of shareholder-creditor relations, we find firms with high credit risk significantly reduce their cash dividends relative to those with low credit risk following the Chaori default shock. Mechanism tests show that high-credit-risk firms experience diminished access to external debt markets while bonds newly issued by such firms are required to obtain higher bond ratings, have additional protective covenants for bondholders, and offer higher premiums following the Chaori default shock. The impact of diminished IGGs strengthens among high-credit-risk firms with fewer cash inflows from bank loans or no newly issued bonds, and among those with outstanding bonds that have protective covenants or lack explicit guarantees. Heterogeneity tests show that the negative impact is more pronounced among high-credit-risk firms with lower economic importance or poorer solvency. Our study highlights the role of IGGs in affecting the shareholder-creditor conflicts through credit risk shifting.
【报告人简介】
何杨，复旦大学管理学院财务学博士，曾赴美国密歇根州立大学进行联合培养。主要研究方向为供应链和公司金融。研究成果发表于Journal of Corporate Finance等期刊。
【特别提醒】
未经论文作者和主办方允许，严禁将讲座内容录制并公开传播，违者将有可能被追究法律责任。
