科学研究
报告题目：Filling the Monitoring Void: Lead Arranger Distraction and Borrower Disclosure
报告人：李雄
报告时间：2026年5月6日（周三）14:15-15:25
报告地点：劝学楼245
主办单位：东北财经大学会计学院 辽宁省资本市场财务与会计研究生创新与学术交流中心
【报告摘要】
This study examines how syndicated loan borrowers adjust disclosure behavior when their lead lenders are distracted by other borrowers in their portfolios. We posit that non-lead loan syndicate participants seek alternative sources of information from borrowers to compensate for reduced monitoring by lead arrangers. Using debt covenant violations of other borrowers in lenders’ portfolios as a proxy for lead arranger “distraction”, we show that borrowers with distracted lead arrangers issue more forward-looking guidance. This effect is more pronounced when syndicate participants possess greater bargaining power, face heightened information needs, or are exposed to higher credit risks, consistent with increased syndicate participant-driven demand for information. We further find that lender distraction is associated with more stringent loan terms in subsequent lending. These results are robust to alternative specification and distraction measures. Overall, our findings offer new insights into the monitoring role of non-lead lenders in the syndicated loan market, a topic previously unexplored in the debt contracting literature.
【报告人简介】
李雄，中国科学技术大学管理学院和科技商学院特任副教授，硕士研究生导师。博士毕业于香港大学，曾在美国华盛顿圣路易斯大学做访问学者。主要研究领域为供应链金融。
【特别提醒】
未经论文作者和主办方允许，严禁将讲座内容录制并公开传播，违者将有可能被追究法律责任。
