科学研究
会计学院2025年学术午餐会（第二期）
报告题目：Employee Mobility Constraints and Stock Option Grants: Evidence from Non-Compete Enforcement
报告人：王璐
报告时间：2025年12月11日（周四）11：50--13：00
报告地点：劝学楼245会议室
【报告摘要】
This paper examines the effect of non-compete enforcement on firms’ incentives to grant stock options to non-executive employees. Exploiting the staggered changes in non-compete enforcement across U.S. states as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that stronger enforcement results in a significant decline in the per-employee value of non-executive stock option grants. This effect is primarily driven by firms facing higher retention pressure. Moreover, the decline is weaker in firms with higher employee incentive needs, higher marginal tax rates, and smaller cash flow shortfalls but stronger in firms with more myopic CEOs. Further analysis reveals that changes in non-compete enforceability do not lead firms to adjust other components of employee compensation. Although cutting the value of non-executive stock option grants reduces employee productivity, it is linked to stronger short-term performance without materially affecting firm value. Overall, our findings highlight the role of labor mobility restrictions in shaping the design of incentive compensation for non-executive employees.
报告人简介：王璐，博士毕业于香港中文大学，会计学院副教授，主要从事员工薪酬激励、企业创新、供应链管理等方向研究。
撰稿：郭亚飞 初审：刘冰 复审：王璐 终审：许浩然
