科学研究
报告题目：Institutional Dual Holdings and Firms’ Executory Contracts with Suppliers: Evidence from Shareholder-Lender Mergers
报告人：徐东玲
报告时间：2025年7月8日（周二）15:10-16:40
报告地点：劝学楼246
主办单位：东北财经大学会计学院 辽宁省资本市场财务与会计研究生创新与学术交流中心
【报告摘要】
Using mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder-creditor incentive alignment, we examine the causal effect of dual holdings on firms’ engagement in executory contracts with suppliers —purchase obligation (PO) contracts. We find that POs significantly decline following the presence of dual holders. This reduction is amplified when dual holders hold junior/unsecured claims, manage longer-maturity debt, or operate in firms with higher cost stickiness or elevated distress risk. Overall, these findings suggest that firms tend to decrease POs to mitigate dual holders’ claim dilution concerns when lender-shareholder mergers enhance incentive alignment between creditors and shareholders and strengthen creditor safeguards.
【报告人简介】
徐东玲，南开大学讲师，香港城市大学会计学博士，主要研究领域为供应链、公司披露、管理会计。
【特别提醒】
未经论文作者和主办方允许，严禁将讲座内容录制并公开传播，违者将有可能被追究法律责任。
