科学研究
报告题目：Commercial Bribery, Anti-corruption and Corporate Tax Compliance
报告人：胡诗阳
报告时间：2024年1月3日（周三）10:00-11:30
报告地点：劝学楼245
主办单位：东北财经大学会计学院 辽宁省资本市场财务与会计研究生创新与学术交流中心
【报告摘要】
Focusing on a reform in China, this study investigates the impact of the reform policy that can curb private sector corruption on Chinese listed firms’ tax compliance. Our results indicate a significant increase in tax compliance among firms affected after the reform, which is also validated under a battery of robustness tests. And this policy effect is stronger in firms with state-owned nature and firms in regions with weak tax enforcement. Further, we employ indicators to implement mechanism tests and confirm that China's reform policy improves corporate tax compliance by suppressing commercial bribery. Based on triangle theory and cognitive dissonance, this study demonstrates that dissonance induced self-justification can create an amplifying feedback loop and downward spiral of immoral behavior. That is to say, a bad behavior may trigger more bad behaviors, and prevent it should eliminate dissonance from the origin. Thus, our findings supplement the empirical evidence on chain reaction between two immoral behaviors of commercial bribery and tax avoidance, highlighting the importance for avoiding immoral commercial activities and improving corporate CSR performance. And our findings enrich the exploration about private sector corruption and corporate tax compliance, providing enlightening references for policymaker to improve taxation system.
【报告人简介】
胡诗阳，重庆大学经济与工商管理学院会计学系副教授，博士研究生导师，MPAcc项目中心主任，巴渝青年学者。博士毕业于北京大学光华管理学院会计学系，2018年至今任教于重庆大学经济与工商管理学院会计学系。主要研究方向包括公司金融、财务会计和银行研究等。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目等多个国家级项目，在《Journal of Corporate Finance》《管理世界》《会计研究》《金融研究》《中国工业经济》等国内外重要期刊发表论文数篇。
【特别提醒】
未经论文作者和主办方允许，严禁将讲座内容录制并公开传播，违者将有可能被追究法律责任。
