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东财•会计与财务论坛 (2026年第26期) :张艺璇
2026年11月17日

报告题目:Tacit Coordination Within Cartels: When Competitors Share Auditors

报告人:张艺璇

报告时间:2026年11月18日(周三)15:00-16:30

报告地点:劝学楼245

主办单位:东北财经大学会计学院 辽宁省资本市场财务与会计研究生创新与学术交流中心

【报告摘要】

Cartels face a fundamental monitoring problem: members must infer whether rivals adhere to agreed-upon prices or output levels, while heightened antitrust enforcement makes direct communication increasingly risky. We examine whether cartel firms respond to heightened enforcement by sharing auditors with cartel peers, since common auditors can generate information spillovers and more comparable reporting that help cartel members monitor compliance without direct communication. Our hypothesis departs from the conventional logic that competing firms generally avoid shared auditors because cross-client spillovers can compromise proprietary advantages. We ask whether shared auditors can benefit cartel partners through improved coordination from client spillovers, which plausibly outweigh the proprietary costs. Using the staggered global adoption of cartel leniency programs, which raised the cost of explicit collusion, and a stacked difference-in-differences design, we find that cartel firms are more likely to share a common auditor following leniency adoption. Cartels with greater common auditor sharing also persist longer, consistent with more stable coordination. This increase is more salient when monitoring is less complex, cartel firms are more similar, accounting signals are noisier, cartel peers account for a larger share of the auditor’s client base, and shared auditors are geographically closer. Exploiting the collapse of Arthur Andersen as an exogenous shock to auditor-client relationships, we find that U.S. industries with larger increases in common auditor sharing among leading firms exhibit higher markups, consistent with common auditors facilitating coordination more broadly. Finally, cartel firms with common auditors exhibit higher earnings comparability, consistent with comparability serving as a coordination channel. Together, these findings are consistent with cartels responding to heightened enforcement by using shared auditors to support tacit coordination, both within cartels and, potentially, more broadly in product markets.

【报告人简介】

张艺璇,香港城市大学会计学博士研究生,研究方向主要包括会计学与产业组织理论的交叉研究,以及会计学与文本分析的交叉研究。相关研究成果发表于《Accounting & Finance》。

【特别提醒】

未经论文作者和主办方允许,严禁将讲座内容录制并公开传播,违者将有可能被追究法律责任。