报告题目：Contracting in a Short-Term Relationship: Evidence from Asset Sales Agreements
讲座形式：腾讯会议（会议ID：474 860 982）
Using a large sample of asset sales agreements compiled from SEC filings, I examine the use of contracting mechanisms in a short-term business relationship. I first show that higher information asymmetry between buyers and sellers is associated with the use of more representations and warranties, covenants, and special payment arrangements. Importantly, my result suggests that these contracting mechanisms are used as complements to one another. Further analysis shows that this complementarity is more pronounced when agency conflicts become more severe. These results differ from prior findings on long-term contracts that different mechanisms usually serve as substitutes. The evidence is consistent with the view that the length of a relationship influences contract efficiency in employing multiple mechanisms—while in a long-term relationship, contracts tend to rely on few provisions, short-term contracts depend more on multiple mechanisms.